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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 19-2995 
________________ 
 
TAMRA N. ROBINSON, 
      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FIRST STATE COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCY  
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D. Del. No. 1:14-cv-01205)  
District Judge:  Hon. Richard G. Andrews 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on June 29, 2020 
 
Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: July 10, 2020) 
 
 ________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiff Tamra Robinson appeals the District Court’s denial of her request for 
appellate attorneys’ fees after she successfully defended a jury verdict in her favor.  
Because Robinson’s claim was legally meritless and we affirmed only due to Defendant 
First State Community Action Agency’s waiver of any argument on this ground, “special 
circumstances” justified the District Court’s denial of appellate attorneys’ fees, and we will 
affirm.   
DISCUSSION1 
While the Americans with Disabilities Act’s fee-shifting provision gives a court 
discretion to “allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee,” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12205, such fees are not guaranteed:  A prevailing party that may “ordinarily recover an 
attorney’s fee” should not do so where “special circumstances would render such an award 
unjust,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (citation omitted).  Such 
circumstances were present here.  
Robinson won a jury verdict based on a legal theory that First State discriminated 
against her because she was regarded as disabled, a theory that was no longer viable after 
the 2008 amendments to the ADA.  See Robinson v. First State Cmty. Action Agency, 920 
F.3d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 2019).  For this victory, Robinson was awarded $135,452.26 in 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review the District Court’s attorneys’ fees award 
for abuse of discretion,” which occurs when “the judge fails to apply the proper legal 
standard or to follow proper procedures in making the determination, or bases an award 
upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.”  United States ex rel. Palmer v. C&D 
Techs., Inc., 897 F.3d 128, 138 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 
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attorneys’ fees.  Robinson then successfully defended this judgment on appeal, but only 
thanks to an error by First State:  First State waived any objection to the “regarded as” 
theory of the case by failing to raise it before the District Court, so we declined to consider 
the issue for the first time on appeal and thus affirmed the District Court’s judgment.  Id. 
at 186–89.  Under these circumstances, awarding appellate attorneys’ fees in addition to 
the fees already awarded would be a “windfall[]” for Robinson’s counsel.  See Farrar v. 
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (citation omitted).  Additionally, because the “regarded 
as” theory of ADA liability is no longer viable and Robinson succeeded only due to First 
State’s missteps, the “legal issue” on which Robinson prevailed has no “significance”; the 
judgment will not “deter future lawless conduct”; and an award of appellate attorneys’ fees 
thus serves no “public purpose.”  See id. at 121–22 (O’Connor, J., concurring).   
In light of these unusual “special circumstances,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 (citation 
omitted), it was within the District Court’s discretion to determine that Robinson “should 
receive no [appellate] attorney’s fees at all,” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115.  
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
 
 
 
